We consider a continuous time two-armed bandit problem in which incomes are described by Poissonian processes. We develop Bayesian approach with arbitrary prior distribution. We present two versions of recursive equation for determination of Bayesian piecewise constant strategy and Bayesian risk and partial differential equation in the limiting case. Unlike the previously considered Bayesian settings our description uses current history of the process and not evolution of the posterior distribution.
1. Introduction. We consider a continuous time two-armed bandit problem. This setting results either in Poissonian or in a diffusion two-armed bandit. Quite general Poissonian two-armed bandit was considered in [1, 2] . In [3] consideration of Poissonian and diffusion bandit problems is restricted to the case of independent arms and discounted rewards. An interesting though a special case of diffusion two-armed bandit is presented in [4] . Some approaches to a discrete time two-armed bandit problem are presented in [5] , [6] , [7] . In the present article, we develop a new general approach to Poissonian two-armed bandit in Bayesian setting.
Formally, Poissonian two-armed bandit is a continuous-time random controlled process X(t). Its values are usually interpreted as incomes and depend only on chosen actions y(t) as follows. If on the time interval t ∈ [τ, τ + t], t > 0 the action y(t ) = was chosen then
In what follows, current values X 1 , X 2 at the point of time t are denoted by X 1 (t), X 2 (t). If one knew λ 1 , λ 2 , he should always choose the action corresponding to the largest of them, his total expected income on the control horizon T would thus be equal to T max(λ 1 , λ 2 ). But if he uses some strategy σ, his total expected income is less than maximal by the value
which is called the regret. Here E σ,θ denotes the mathematical expectation with respect to the measure generated by strategy σ and parameter θ.
Let's assign a prior distribution density µ(θ) = µ(λ 1 , λ 2 ) on the set of parameters Θ. Corresponding Bayesian risk is defined as follows
the optimal strategy σ B is called Bayesian strategy. The minimax risk on the set Θ is defined as
corresponding optimal strategy σ M is called minimax strategy.
A direct method of determining minimax strategy and minimax risk does not exist. However, one can determine them with the use of the main theorem of the theory of games. According to this theorem the following equality holds (1.5) i.e. minimax risk is equal to the Bayesian one calculated with respect to the worst-case prior distribution and minimax strategy coincides with corresponding Bayesian strategy. Note that in case of finite set Θ determination of the minimax risk according to equality (1.5) is not laborious because Bayesian risk is a concave function of the prior distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Recursive Bellman-type equation for determining Bayesian risk for piece-wise constant strategies is presented in Section 2. Note that our approach differs from presented in [1] , [2] because we recalculate Bayesian risk with respect to current statistics (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) and in [1] , [2] recalculations are implemented with respect to current posterior distribution and t = t 1 + t 2 . Our approach is applied to quite general sets Θ. The approach presented in [1] , [2] is applied to finite sets of parameters and generalization to arbitrary sets is not obvious. In Section 3, another version of recursive equation is derived. In a limiting case, we obtain a partial differential equation which is presented in Section 4.
2. Recursive equation. Let's consider piece-wise constant strategies {σ (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )}. To this end, we assume that control horizon is partitioned into a number of intervals of the length ∆ on which the chosen action does not change. Hence, T = N ∆ and for any n 1 + n 2 = n < N , t 1 = n 1 ∆, t 2 = n 2 ∆ we have Pr(y(t ) = ) = σ (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) where σ (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) is constant on the time interval t ∈ [n∆, (n + 1)∆]. The posterior distribution at the point of time t = t 1 + t 2 is calculated as
Since p(0, 0; λ) = 1, this formula remains correct if t 1 = 0 and/or t 2 = 0. Denote x + = max(x, 0). With the use of (1.1) we obtain the following standard recursive Bellman-type equation for determining Bayesian risk (1.3) with respect to the posterior distribution (2.1)
Here {R ( ) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )} are expected losses if initially the -th action is applied at the control horizon of the length ∆ and then control is optimally implemented ( = 1, 2) .
Bayesian risk (1.3) is calculated by the formula R T (µ) = R(0, 0, 0, 0). (2.6) Equation (2.3)-(2.5) determine at the same time Bayesian risk and Bayesian strategy. Bayesian strategy prescribes to choose -th action (i.e σ (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) = 1) if R ( ) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) has smaller value. In case of a draw R (1) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) = R (2) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) the choice is arbitrary.
Another version of recursive equation.
In this section, we obtain another version of recursive Bellman-type equation. Let's denotẽ
where {R(X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )} are Bayesian risks calculated with respect to the posterior distribution (2.1) and {µ(X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )} are defined in (2.2). Then the following recursive equation holds
where
Bayesian strategy prescribes to choose -th action (i.e σ (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) = 1) ifR ( ) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) has smaller value. In case of a drawR (1) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) = R (2) (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) the choice is arbitrary. Bayesian risk (1.3) is calculated by the formula
Formulas (3.1)-(3.4) follow from (2.3)-(2.6). One should multiply lefthand side and right-hand side of (2.5) by µ(X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) and implement mathematical transformations.
A limiting description.
In this section, we consider the case when ∆ has a small value. In this case (3.3) takes the form (1)R (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) = −R(X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )X 1 t
−1 1
+R(X 1 + 1, t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )(X 1 + 1)t
R (X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) = −R(X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 )X 2 t Note that partial differential equation at the same time describes the evolution ofR(X 1 , t 1 , X 2 , t 2 ) and the strategy. The strategy must chooseth action if the -th member in the left-hand side of (4.3) has smaller value, in case of a draw the choice of the action may be arbitrary.
